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NATURE OF THE CASE 
This action involved the foreclosure of a mortgage against 
a subdivision known as LAKEVIEW TERRACE SUBDIVISION, brought by the 
appellant. The District Court of Davis County awarded eight (8) 
lien claimants a first priority of an aggregate $44,732.86 over the 
appellant's Trust Deed from which ruling the aopellant aooeals. 
The respondent-cross apoellant, Child Brothers, Inc., aooeals from 
the dismissal of its Crossclaim against defendant C. N. Zur.del and 
Associates and Mountain Springs Construction Company of Utah, for 
failure of warranty for orooerty deeded to Child Brothers Inc., 
and for damages incurred to Child Brothers, Inc., for its work per-
formed on Lakeview Terrace Subdivision. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
On January 12, 1978, the trial court heard all motions 
for Summary Judgment, and thereafter on January 24, 1978, awarded 
eight (8) lien claimants first priority over the aooellant's Trust 
Deed, and dismissed all Counterclaims and Crossclaims in this action. 
Thereafter, on February 1, 1978, the Court again ordered Summary 
Judgment for the respondents for their liens amounting to $44,732.86, 
and dismissed all counterclaims and Crossclaims in the action without 
~avlng taken any testimony. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
It is from the February l, 1978, Order dismissing all Cross-
claims and Counterclaims that Child Brothers, Inc., seeks reversal and 
remand to the lower court that a trial may be held on its Crossclaim 
against C. N. Zundel and Associates and Mountain Springs Construction 
Company of Utah. Child Brothers, Inc., further seeks that the Court 
uphold the trial court's determination giving it and the other lien 
claimants first priority over the Trust Deed of the appellant. 
FACTS OF THE CASE 
On November 15, 197 3 Child Brothers, Inc., (hereinafter re-
ferred to as Child) commenced the first work that it oerformed on the 
subject property known as the Lakeview Terrace Subdivision, by doing 
pipeline, water system, storm drains and sewer system work. (Depo-
sition of Eugene Child, p. 5). The work which was performed by Child 
was performed prior to the recording of the Trust Deed between Zundel 
and Associates (hereinafter referred to as Zundel) and First of Denver 
Mortgage Investors (hereinafter referred to as FDMI), which Trust Deed 
covered the subject property and was recorded on February 19, 1974. 
Child continued to work on the subject property throughout the years 
1974, 1975 and 1976. During the period between March and June, 1976, 
Pat Sinclair of Mountain Springs Construction Company of Utah 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-3-
(hereinafter referred to as Mountain Springs), the successor in 
interest to Zundel, persuaded Eugene Child, president of Child 
Brothers to take a Warranty Deed to 2 loG on the subject property 
in order that Mountain Springs could continue with the work on the 
project. (See Deposition of Eugene Child p. 17). In June, 1976, 
a check in the amount of $13,210.00 along with a Warranty Deed to 
two (2) lots in the subject subdivision, were given to Child for 
the obligation owing to it by Zundel and Mountain Springs in the 
approximate sum of $22,000.00. (Deposition of Eugene Child p. 19). 
Eugene Child was informed by both Pat Sinclair of Mountain Springs 
and a Mr. Kenyon Gurr of Security Title, who was doing the title 
work for Mountain Springs on the subdivision, that there was a 
$12,000.00 mortgage or a 70% selling price mortgage, whichever was 
greater, on the property, and that by taking the lots Child would 
be assured of receiving all the money due him. (Deposition of 
Eugene Child p.23 through 26). However, neither Mr. Sinclair nor 
Mr. Gurr informed Eugene Child that the title to the property would 
be worthless within a week's time because there was a default provi-
sion in the Trust Deed which required the $12,000.00 or 7~/o selling 
price to be paid by July l, 1976 or else the property would automa-
tically revert back to FDMI. (Deposition of Eugene Child p. 27). 
Based upon the representations of Mr. Gurr and Pat Sinclair, 
Child took the Warranty Deed to the lots and thereafter decreased the 
balance owlng to it by Zundel/Mountain Springs by approximately 
$22,000.00. A release of all liens and claims was recorded on June 22, 
1976, which was signed by Eugene Child on behalf of Child Brothers 
Inc., though Mr. Child was unaware of ever having signed the document. 
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(Deposition of Eugene Child p. 23). Thereafter Child, continued to 
work on the project and did its last work on October l, 1976. (Depo-
sition of Eugene Child p. 33). A Notice of Lien was thereafter filed 
by Child on November 30, 1976. 
Zundel conveyed its interest in the subject property to 
Mountain Springs on August 8, 1975. The shareholders of Mountain 
Spring were the same individuals (with the exception of C. N. Zundel) 
as the limited partners of Zundel and Associates with Pat Sinclair as 
the new president and executive officer of Mountain Springs. Child 
was not informed of the change in ownership of the property at the 
time it occurred, but discovered the transfer at a much later date. 
(Deposition of Eugene Child pp. 14 and 20). At all times, Child was 
requested to continue its work by the parties who appeared to be the 
same personnel, with only a change in name. Child never opened a new 
account with Mountain Springs, but merely transferred the balance 
owing to it from Zundel work to Mountain Springs. 
The appellant commenced this action upon the default of 
Mountain Springs on the Notffidue and owing to it which were secured 
by the subject property. On November 30, 1977, Child entered this 
suit and Crossclaimed against Zundel and Mountain Springs for the 
money due it for the work performed, and also for failure of warranty 
on the two lots which were conveyed to Child. (R-428). 
The minute entries of December 8, 1977 and December 12, 
1977 stated that the appellant would foreclose on the procerty for 
$1,900,000.00, and take no deflciency. (R-443 and 453). Thereaftec 
on December 20, 1977, the trial court entered Judgment and Decree of 
Foreclosure wherein appellants were granted Judgment for $2.358, 396.c: 
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but that appellants would only look to the subject property for 
$1,900,000.00 of its Judgment. (R-488) Thereafter the subject 
property was sold on January 19, 1978 at a Sheriff's Sale with the 
appellant , F.D.M.I., being the sole bidder for the subject property 
and bidding the amount of its Judgment against the subject property 
in the amount of $1,900,000.00. (R-637 and 641) The trial court 
thereafter determined the priority of liens and placed the lien claim-
ants in a first priority position over the Trust Deed of the appellant. 
The appellant thereafter amended its bid to the amount of $1,944,732.86. 
(R-614, 627 and 629) The trial court thereafter, on February lst, 
dismissed all Crossclaims and Counterclaims (R-618, 620, 633, and 645) 
without any hearing or notice to the respondent/ crossclaimant, 
Child Brothers, Inc. (See Affidavit of Randy Ludlow, attached hereto). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE APPELL4\NT'S APPEAL SHOULD BE DISMISSED 
SINCE THE APPELLANT HAS RECEIVED THE BENEFITS 
OF ITS JUDGMENT. 
No matter which way this court rules as to the priority of 
the lien claimants' claims and the Trust Deed of the appellant, the 
lien claimants will still be entitled to $44,732.86 of the $1,944,732.86 
bid by the appellant for the subject property. The appellant on Decem-
ber 8, 1977, and on December 12, 1977, stipulated and agreed, as noted 
ln those Minute Entries, that it would only look to the subject 
property for the sum of $1,900,000.00. (R-443 and 453) Thereafter, 
on December 20, 1977, the trial court entered a Judgment and Decree 
of Foreclosure, (R-488) wherein the appellant was granted Judgment 
for $2,358,396.00. However, the Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure 
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noted that the appellant was to receive only $1,900,000.00 from the 
sale of the property, which $1,900,000.00 had been established in 
the Minute Entries previously referred to. At the foreclosure sale, 
held on January 19, 1978, the appellant bid the sum of $1,900,000.00. 
The appellant in actuality and effect had stipulated and been awarded 
by the trial court a Judgment in the amount of $1,900,000.00. The 
appellant's claim had been fully satisfied at the foreclosure sale. 
The trial court thereafter on January 24, l978,adjudged 
the mechanic's liens as having priority over the appellant's Trust 
Deed. (R-614 ) . Thought the appellant was not obligated to bid in 
the amount of the lien claimants' claims, the appellant amended its 
bid to the sum of $1,944, 732.86, which amount pays the Judgment of 
all lien claimants and the appellant. When a party consents to a 
Judgment or accepts the benefits of a Judgment, it is precluded from 
appealing to this Honorable Court. See Cornia v. Cornia, 80 Ut 486, 
15 P2d 631 (1932), and Dawson v. Board of Education of Weber Countv, 
118 Ut 452, 222 P2d 590 (1950). The appellant had consented to a 
Judgment in the amount of $1,900,000.00 and had, as bidder to the 
property, received the benefit of its Judgment. The appellant has 
the right to receive its Judgment in the amount of $1,900,000.00. 
The $44,732.88 excess which the appellant bid, under which it had no 
obligation to bid but chose to add to its original bid, belongs to 
the lien clalmants herein. The entire amount as sought by both the 
lien claimants and the appellant having been bid, the clalms of all 
parties have been satisfied. The appeal herein should be accordingl~ 
dismissed with the appellant ordered to pay the $44,732,86 
it is holding, to the lien claimants. 
which 
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POINT II. CHILD BROTHERS, INC. 'S LIEN TAKES PRIORITY 
OVER THE TRUST DEED OF THE APPELLANT. 
Utah Code Annotated Section 38-1-5 states as follows: 
"Priority--Over other encumbrances.-- The liens herein provided 
for shall relate back to, and take effect as of, the time of 
the commencement to do work or furnish materials on the ground 
for the structure or improvement, and shall have priority over 
any lien, mortgage or other encumbrance which may have attached 
subsequently to the time when the building, improvement or 
structure was commenced, work begun, or first material furnished 
on the ground; also over any lien, mortgage or other encumbrance 
of which the lien holder had no notice and which was unrecorded 
at the time the building, structure or improvement was commenced, 
work begun, or first material furnished on the ground." 
The first work performed in this matter by Child was per-
formed on November 15, 1973. (Deposition of Eugene Child, Exh. 1) 
This work was done three months prior to the filing of appellant's 
Trust Deed on February 19, 1974. Work which was performed by Child 
was digging holes, locating sewer and water lines, and laying stakes 
to mark the lines, which work was performed with the engineers of 
the project. (Deposition of Eugene Child, p. 5, 48 and 49) The work 
of Child, by statute, has priority over the Trust Deed of the apoel-
lant since it was commenced prior to the filing of apoellant's Trust 
Deed. The work of Child is outside the scope of Aladdin Heating Cor-
poration v. Trustees of the Central States, 563 P2d 82 (1977 Nev.) 
as cited by the appellant, which case held that where there is no 
actual on-site construction on real property, mechanic's liens could 
not relate back to the time before there was any "visible signs of 
constructlon to inform prospective lenders inspecting the premises 
that llens had attached." At P2d 84. In the case before this court, 
there were actual signs of construction work which would place any 
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person inspecting the property on notice of the commencement of 
construction. The work of Child on November 15, 1973, had Placed 
the world on notice of the commencement of its work and of its 
lien. 
This case also does not fall under the doctrine as set 
forth in Western Mortgage Loan Corporation v. Cottonwood Construe-
tion Company, 18 U2d 409, 424 P2d 437 (1967) as expounded by the 
appellant. This Court stated at P2d 439, 
"To tack the liens for labor or materials that went into the 
construction of the house to the liens that may have arisen 
for labor and materials furnished in off-site improvements in 
connection with the laying out and construction of facilities 
used in connection with the subdivision as a whole would be 
going beyond the intent of the statute. The problem is one 
of notice. The presence of materials on the building site 
or evidence on the ground that work has commenced on a struc-
ture or preparatory ~hereto is notice to all the world that 
liens may have attac~ed. However, the off-site construction 
in developing the s~bdl~~slon for building sites would not 
necessarily bring to the attention of a lender that someone 
is claiming a lien on a particular lot in the subdivision. 
This is especially true as in this case, where the lender 
advanced money to build a home long after the subdivision had 
been laid out and developed. It is apparent that the persons 
who supplied labor or materials for the construction of roads, 
sewers, etc., could have filed liens for unpaid balances due 
them, if any. The erection of the home was separate and sev-
erable from the earlier work in developing the subdivision." 
Based upon the factual situation and language set forth in 
Western Mortgage Loan Corporation, that case is totally inapolicable 
to the situa~ion presented to the court herein. The apoellant herein 
is foreclosing an entire subdivision, not a oarticular house. Child 
is claiming a lien on the entire area being forclosed by the ao9ellant 
not a lien against an individual home as was the case in Western Mort-
gage Loan Corporation. The appellant was on notice in this mat~er. 
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while there was no notice to the lender in Western Mortgage and Loan. 
When an entire subdivision is being foreclosed, as was the case in 
this matter, off-site improvements, which relate to the entire sub-
division, would place a lender on notice of their existence. The 
notice requirement that was set forth in Western Mortgage Loan Cor-
poration has been met by Child in this matter, making the Western 
Mortgage Loan case inapplicable in this situation. 
The problem which must be decided by this court in deter-
mining the priority of the lien of Child to the Trust Deed of the 
appellant rests upon the effect of the release of all liens and 
claims recorded on June 22, 1976. (Deposition of Eugene Child, 
Exh. 3) In Boise Cascade Corporation v. Stephens, 572 P2d 1380, 
(1977 Utah), this court addressed the question of 
"When a materialman signs a lien waiver for material furnished 
and thereafter furnishes additional material on the same job, 
does the priority date for the subsequent material relate back 
to the date of first delivery?" At P2d 1380. 
This court answered this question in the affirmative, noting certain 
limitations. The facts in this particular matter show that Child 
falls within the doctrine set forth in Boise Cascade Corporation. 
The facts previously noted are: 
1. Child commenced work on the project on November 15, 1973. 
(Deposition of Eugene Child, Exh. 1). 
2. Child continued working on the project continuously 
throughout the years 1974, 1975 and 1976 and performed its last work 
on October 1, 1976. (Deposition of Eugene Child and Exh. 1 and 2 
contained therein) 
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3. Child was unaware of the assignment of the property 
from Zundel to Mountain Springs, and upon discovery, was informed 
by Mountain Springs that they were taking over the account of Zundel. 
No new account was opened for Mountain Springs but merely the account 
of Zundel was transferred to them. (Deposition of Eugene Child pp. 
14 and 20; also Exh. 1 and 2) 
4. The principal individuals involved in the project with 
Zundel were the same people involved in the project with Mountain 
Springs. (Brief of appellant p. 2) 
Under the facts set forth above, Child meets the require-
ments set forth in the Boise Cascade Corporation case, but there is 
also a policy reason as to why Child should have priority over the 
appellant's Trust Deed. Eugene Child was informed by Mountain Springs 
that the only way which he could obtain his money was by taking a 
deed to two lots. After a considerable amount of Persuasion and 
pleading from Pat Sinclair of Mountain Springs, Child took a Warranty 
Deed to lots in the project, and thereafter executed the rel~ase of 
lien. (Deposition of Eugene Child pp. 23 through 27) Child was not 
forewarned by Mountain Springs or the individual doing the title work 
for Mountain Springs on the subdivision, Mr. Kenyon Gurr, that the 
Warranty Deed would be worthless within ten (10) days because title 
would revert back to FDMI because of the mortgage provisions. (De?o-
sition of Eugene Child p. 27) Child had thus traded a valuable lien 
priority for a worthless piece of ?aper. Justice Crockett in Boise 
Cascade Corporation stated in his concurring opinion, at P2d 1382, 
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"A primary purpose of the lien statues is to guard against a 
laborer (or a material supplier) from working on a building and 
being cheated of the reward of his labor and thus avoiding evil 
consequences to him, his family, and the economy generally." 
Child had been literally cheated out of his superior position by 
Mountain Springs. Such conduct by Mountain Springs should not be 
allowed, especially when Child has met the requirements as set forth 
in the Boise Cascade Corporation case. 
It should be noted that Child and the appellant had entered 
into a Stipulation in January of 1978 wherein Child stipulated to being 
in a second priority position. At the hearing on January 12, 1978, 
the Boise Cascade Corporation case was produced by the attorney for 
the respondent, Bland Brothers, which case the attorney for Child had 
failed to find in its research and was unaware of at the time of 
entering into the Stipulation. The trial court, after receiving the 
Boise Cascade Corporation case, ruled in Child's favor, and disre-
garded the Stipulation previously entered. The trial court deter-
mined the Boise Cascade Corporation case to be controlling in this 
matter, and therefore awarded Child its priority over the Trust Deed 
of the appellant. The ruling of the trial court awarding the respon-
dent, Child, priority over the appellant should be sustained. 
POINT III. THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE DISMISSED 
THE CROSSCLAIMS OF CHILD BROTHERS, INC., 
WITHOUT A TRIAL OR HEARING. 
Motions for Summary Judgment as to the oriority of the lien 
claims against the property had been made and argued on January 12, 
1978. The trial court thereafter, on January 24, 1978, awarded the 
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lien claimants priority over the appellant. The attorney for Child 
telephoned the trial court clerk on February 1, 1978, to make sure 
that the trial on the Crossclaims and Counterclaims was going to be 
held that day. The Clerk informed the attorney for Child, after 
having discussed the matter with the trial judge, that there would 
be no trial held that day, such trial date having been vacated 
because of the January 24, 1978 Order. Contrary to the information 
given to the Crossclaimant, Child, a hearing was held on February 1, 197: 
at which hearing the trial court dismissed the Crossclaim of 
Child and Zundel and Mountain Springs. 
Child has a valid claim against Mountain Springs for the 
failure of warranty on the lots deeded to Child by Warranty Deed, 
which lots were foreclosed against by the appellant. (20 AmJur2d 
Covenants, Sec. 50 through 55) Equity demands that the clalm of 
Child against Mountain Springs and Zundel be heard and not summarily 
dismissed as was done by the trial court. Child asks this court to 
reverse and remand that portion of this action which deals with the 
Crossclaim of Child against Zundel and Mountain Springs. 
CONCLUSION 
The appellant's appeal should be dismissed. The apoellant 
has received the benefits of his Judgment and has obtained all that 
it desired from the sale of the property, and all that it desired in 
its Judgment in thls matter. $44,732.86 of the $1,944,732.86 aopell-
ant bid ln at the Sheriff's Sale should immediately be caid to ~he 
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respondents, and this appeal accordingly dismissed. 
The trial court determination of the lien claimants having 
first priority over the Trust Deed of the apPellant should be upheld. 
Child had commenced work on the subject property three months prior 
to the filing of the appellant's Trust Deed, and thus, by statute, 
and case law should be given first priority in this matter. 
In the event that this court does not give Child first 
priority over the Trust Deed of appellant. this matter should be re-
manded to the trial court for a hearing on the failure of warranty 
of the title to the lots deeded Child by Mountain Springs. 
-fiURly submitted, 
---'r ! '-,._ ~-, ' 
C\ ~~~ ~ r, I I .>, / ' _..-...., / y"-........; )1•'''---~·"d~C ~,s"'·. /·v'\-<-
NDY sf. L~LOW -----=--- ~ 
At 9rney fo~ Child Brothers, Inc. 
325 South- Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
FIRST OF DENVER MORTGAGE 
INVESTORS; and CITIBANK, N.A. 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
-vs-
C. N. ZUNDEL AND ASSOCIATES, 
a limited partnership; et al. 
Defendants and Respondents. 
STATE OF UTAH 
ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
A F F I D A V I T 
Case No. 15696 
COMES NOW Randy S. Ludlow, being first duly sworn, deposes 
and states as follows: 
l. That he is the attorney for Child Brothers, Inc., and 
has represented Child Brothers, Inc., throughout the entire proceed-
ings in this matter. 
2. That on February l, 1978, he personally telephoned the 
Clerk of the District Court in Farmington, Utah, to request informa-
tion concerning the trial which was supposed to be held on that date 
to 1determine whether or not said trial was still going to be held. 
3. That he was informed by the Clerk of the Court that that 
trlal date had been vacated by the trial judge. 
4. That affiant then asked the Clerk to contact the Judge 
and ask the Judge if this matter had, in fact, been vacated. 
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5. That said Clerk of the Court then contacted the Judge, 
and informed Affiant that the Judge had stated that the trial that 
was to be held that day had been vacated. 
6. That based upon those representations, the affiant did 
not appear in Farmington for a trial that day in this matter. 
7. That the attorney for Zundel and the attorney for FDMI 
did, in fact, appear at the court that day, and requested a trial be 
held in this matter, upon which the trial court thereafter held trial, 
and dismissed the Crossclaim and Counterclaims of the respondent and 
crossclaimant, Child Brothers, Inc. 
8. That the affiant and Child Brothers, Inc., would have 
appeared in court for the hearing on February l, 1978, had it not 
been for the representations made to them by the Clerk of the Court. 
Further affiant saith naught. 
DATED this 17th day of August, 1978. 
I ,----- I 
1.'<1 ',A_-«1 '\,;,-- //_ 
Y S. 
1 
LUDLQW 
'v ' ' 
'-Subscribed and sworn to before me th-±s 17th day of August, 
1978. 
My Commission Expires: 
,/ 
---
NOTARY PUBLIC residing at 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
'I 
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